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2. Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,”
Partisan Review 6 (Fall 1939): 34–49. On the commercial commissions Wyeth took during these
years and the contract for more Post covers, which
he refused, see Richard Meryman, Andrew Wyeth: A
Secret Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 181.
3. Anne Classen Knutson convened the panel,
“Rethinking Andrew Wyeth.” Texts by panel
participants—David Cateforis, Wanda M. Corn,
Katie Robinson Edwards, Joyce Hill Stoner, and
Francine Weiss—form the core of the book.
4. Sam Hunter, critic for the Minneapolis Tribune,
dismissed Wyeth’s work in these terms in 1967, as
portraying “the kind of America . . . that one finds
set forth typically in the hard, illustrative conventions of the Time Magazine cover: a microscopic
realism applied to familiar, commonplace subject
matter that is in the end reassuring.” Hunter
quoted in Cateforis, 19–20.
5. See Michael Lobel, “Modernism, Illustrated:
Sloan and Duchamp,” John Sloan: Drawing on
Illustration (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2014), 155–81.
6. See, for example, Robert Rosenblum,
“Reintroducing Norman Rockwell,” in Maureen
Hart Hennessey and Anne Knutson, Norman
Rockwell: Pictures for the American People, exh. cat.
(New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1999), 183–85.
7. Richard Halpern, Norman Rockwell: The
Underside of Innocence (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 2006).
8. The term went viral with the publication of
Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success
(New York: Little, Brown, 2008).
9. Wanda Corn created the survey for her 1973
exhibition, The Art of Andrew Wyeth, at the
M. H. de Young Memorial Museum of the Fine
Arts Museums of San Francisco. The same
questionnaire was used to poll visitors to the
Philadelphia Museum of Art’s 2006 retrospective,
Andrew Wyeth: Memory and Magic.
10. Cateforis notes this trend in the period criticism, when he writes of accounts that “portrayed
[Wyeth] as an exemplar of an honorable and
distinctly American realist tradition quite apart
from contemporary movements” (8). His art was
a “‘refuge’ for those ‘intimidated’ by modernism”
(16).
11. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology
of Things (Durham and London: Duke University
Press, 2010), viii.
12. See ibid., viii–ix.
13. Charles Brock, “Through a Glass: Windows
in the Art of Wyeth, Sheeler, and Hopper,” in
Andrew Wyeth: Looking Out, Looking In, exh. cat.,
ed. Nancy K. Anderson and Brock (Washington,
DC: National Gallery of Art, 2014), 42–44.
Jennifer A. Greenhill is associate professor of art
history, criticism, and interpretive theory at the
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Her
publications include Playing It Straight: Art and
Humor in the Gilded Age (University of California
Press, 2012), and A Companion to American Art,
coedited with John Davis and Jason LaFountain
(Wiley-Blackwell Press, 2015). Her current book
project, “The Commercial Imagination,” investigates the haptic and conceptual logics of popular
illustration during the early twentieth century.
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Alex Potts. Experiments in Modern
Realism: World Making, Politics and
the Everyday in Postwar European and
American Art. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2013. 476 pp., 60 color ills.,
120 b/w. $60
In an effort to challenge some prevailing
assumptions surrounding the art of the
painter Wols—whose work various critics in
the late 1940s associated with the expression
of existential unease—Alex Potts proposes
that what Wols truly wished to convey was
“a real sense of the substance of the world,”
its “bare non-art materiality” (119–20). An
anecdote supplied by the critic René Guilly
on the occasion of Wols’s 1947 Paris exhibition provides some evidence for that contention, even as it reveals the artist’s feelings of
inadequacy in the face of his task. Walking
by a decomposing wall glimpsed through
a pane of broken glass, Wols is said to have
lamented, “My painting will never achieve
that” (119). He may have meant that his art
was incapable of the immediacy and directness he associated with the “real.” Perhaps, as
Potts suggests, Wols’s disappointment came
from recognizing that his desire for “rendering the reality of things” in their “brute
materiality” was incommensurate with
working in mediums that were each bound,
for better or worse, to sets of historical conventions that conditioned artistic representation (120). Nonetheless, in Potts’s ambitious
account of twentieth-century realism, some
version of Wols’s aspiration—to convey as
if directly the “vivid actuality” (326) and
“material substance” (3) of things—widely
animates the experimental practices of postwar artists.
Indeed, it is on the basis of a shared
desire to evoke the “non-artistic actualities
of everyday life” (113) and to “embody a
compelling sense of the underlying fabric
of things” (157) that Potts sees the artists
his study gathers together as united against
the hegemony of modernist abstract painting—especially insofar as it was critically
championed as concerned solely with resolving certain historically generated formal
problems in an effort to make explicit a
medium-specific logic of development. Potts
offers us an expanded notion of realism, not
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simply defining it against abstraction, but
seeing it as a strategy that connects previously sequestered artists. So the late paintings of the Abstract Expressionist Roberto
Matta Echaurren are realist because their
imagery evokes a techno-scientific world
impinging on human subjectivity, and so
are the smashed musical instruments of the
French New Realist Arman, who appropriated junked material as a way to comment
on the waste at the root of the modern
consumer society. Moving expertly between
better- and less-studied figures—from Jean
Dubuffet, Andy Warhol, and Gerhard Richter
to Eduardo Paolozzi, Öyvind Fahlström, and
Asger Jorn—Potts shows how an eclectic
stable of artists responded to what they felt
was modernist art’s constricted range of
reference, and modernist criticism’s narrow perspectives, by cultivating strategies
that were meant to be “evocative of the lived
realities of the contemporary world” (174).
Those realities, for Potts, are characterized by
the “unstable, constantly shifting interactions
between bodies and things and environments in the modern world, as well as the
underlying processes of production, consumption and destruction shaping this world
and its anxieties and compulsions” (327).
It is not Potts’s undertaking to explain in
detail the historical roots and contemporary
consequences of these underlying processes;
nor is it his mandate to trace in detail the
historical parameters of modernity’s abstracting tendencies. These are not his goals. But
if the absence of those accounts is felt by
some readers to be a gap in the author’s text,
it is a necessary consequence of his balancing the wide range of work he investigates
with finely tuned descriptions of particular
examples.1 Even so, Potts evokes throughout
his account the systematic antihumanism
of late capitalism as the chief motivating
factor behind mid-century experimental
realism. The domain of modernity’s instrumentalized, rationalized, and dehumanizing
structures constitutes a kind of basic setting
against which the practices of artists stand
out in sharp relief. It is primarily in resistance to political and societal abstraction—to
a perceived distancing of individual feeling,
thought, and action from an affirmative
collective setting—that a number of artists
develop procedures to convey more directly
the “embeddedness of human subjectivity in
the materiality of the body and the material
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substance and fabric of the world around it”
(72). Both Jackson Pollock and Dubuffet, for
instance, permitted a sense of the material
substance of paint to so fully absorb them in
the act of painting that subsequent viewers
might similarly feel “literally immersed” (79)
in their canvases, or stimulated into “reliving the physical activities and sensations
that were involved in making” them (137).
By identifying her position with that of the
artist, a viewer would entertain not just a
metaphor of practice and process, but would
actually experience a kind of situatedness
that is noticeably absent from her experience
at large.
In his evaluation of what makes modernist art in its putatively insulated and
self-referential forms inimical to a broader
integration of art with life, Potts reaffirms
as central to understanding the art of this
period a commonly asserted, if somewhat
reductive, antithesis between autonomy and
engagement. If modernism accords priority
to the former term, experimental realism
is concerned with the latter. It is of course
possible to see autonomy in a positive light
as counteracting a chaotic reality which
operates in its everyday unfolding as repressive ideology, and so modernist art might be
seen as a successful challenge to disorder and
insensitivity everywhere.2 But a skeptic might
argue that modernist artists can establish
only fictions of aesthetic wholeness, order,
or self-sufficiency. On this view, modernist
autonomy, with its illusion of wholeness,
becomes a kind of evasion of the facts: an
unsustainable, fictive release from the determining realities of politics and struggle in
the real world. Experimental realists reject
the privilege usually accorded to the fictive
mode and see modernist forms of abstraction as incapable of a “more compelling evocation” of reality (140).3
Here is where the experience of the
“everyday”(55) confronts the formalistic
conception of “pure” art (202) with historical reality and places an ethical demand
on those artists who would be “truer to
the conditions of the times” (159–60) by
expressing that experience through art. It is
important to bear this emphasis in mind.
Potts acknowledges a distinction between the
literal (our actual experience) and the representational (how an artist frames that experience). “Artistic realism,” he cautions us at
the outset of his argument, “has to do with

the representational significance and evocative
power of a work, not just the literally nonartistic identity of the materials from which
it is made” (7, emphasis added). Still, certain
passages seem to collapse the difference
between the literal and representational. For
example, some French New Realists wanted

to “effect a more direct encounter” between
art and audience not just by representing,
but by “embody[ing] a truly immediate and
vital sense of modern reality” (207, emphasis
added). The implicit idea that literal materials somehow embody content has important
consequences for understanding the relation
of intention to expression. When we admit
no discrepancy between actual materiality
and the content which some material object
is meant to convey, we suspend the criteria
by which we can determine what the work
(or action) of art is. If we don’t know what
the work of art is, we have no principled
means by which we can make interpretative
claims about it. To see material as identical
to content is to make no distinction between
what an artist means and what he or she
doesn’t mean.4
While he values the evocative “resonance” of works that seem to be produced
without conscious planning, Potts ultimately
appears to validate the intentional character
of artistic production. Meaning as such, he
says, requires “some level of intentionality”
(52) that would guarantee the “significance
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[of details] beyond their mere particularity”
(53). While “some” seems to hedge against
according too much importance to intention, and while it is true that the practices of
experimental realists often seem to eschew
deliberate attempts to realize a preconceived
image, their resulting works (or events) are
nonetheless delimited and framed by artistic
intentions. While Rauschenberg’s Rebus (1955)
might appear to be composed of an arbitrary
selection of everyday images and materials—
a selection, moreover, that might entice the
viewer to draw any number of connections
between the elements, or to entertain the
contingent associations they evoke—the
work nonetheless “constitute[s] a kind of
totality” (274). In fact, it is nothing less than
Rauschenberg’s directed manipulation of
his heterogeneous materials that enables, in
Potts’s great description, the “constellation of
motifs and images [to] constitut[e] a world
of a particular kind, which like the worlds
one inhabits is never fully graspable or containable” (274). Here, the artist’s potential
for “world-making” is fundamentally tied to
representing (as opposed to actualizing) his
“experience.”
Still, Potts’s obvious sympathy with the
antiformalist works and practices he discusses occasionally dampens the reader’s
awareness of the author’s representational
commitments. Potts tends to express the
challenge experimental realism poses to
modernist autonomy by describing realist art
as “concrete,” “direct,” “immediate,” “particular,” “brute,” and “actual.” But are these
terms meant to designate the literal character
of an experience or material, or instead to
describe representational effects? At a number of places in the text, it is unclear. Potts,
though, usually provides guidance, reminding his readers that experimental realism
“evokes,” “suggests,” “portrays,” “conveys,”
“references,” or (a preferred term) “resonates” with the “facticity of things” external to the realm of art. These latter terms
connote art’s representational character.
So, while Potts focuses on the “directness
and crudity” of the realist devices Edward
Kienholz deployed in his installation Roxy’s
(1962) and agrees with early critics who
saw the artist as achieving a striking impact
through an “uncompromisingly direct rendering of real-life subjects” (293), Potts
notes—the point is crucial—that it is only
the “apparent absence of aesthetic qualities”
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that allowed Kienholz to “convey [his] highly
charged content with such immediacy” (293,
emphasis added). The artist, in other words,
carefully orchestrated the effects of his art.
If experimental realist artists reach out
to the political, cultural, social, and economic conditions of the modern world, they
do so by means of material made into artistic
media (this is true whether “material” is
understood in its traditional application or
as an expanded category including artists
and viewers in a live situation). “Any realist
work,” Potts writes, “even the most paltry
or conventional one, is different in its literal
substance from the reality it represents”
(28). Art represents reality; it does not just
present us with real stuff. While Potts is not
as explicit in this book as he is in The Sculptural
Imagination about the critical stakes of the
debate between literalism and representation
(there he provides a sustained discussion of
the issue), he implicitly recognizes what we
might call an ontological distinction between
the work of art (and by extension, the artist’s
meaning it expresses) and its actual material
(and whatever contingent associations those
materials might inspire a viewer to make). So
although to some readers it might sound as if
what makes experimental realism significant
for the history of art is its identification of
meaning with the viewer’s literal experience,
nothing could be further from the truth. In
fact, all the artists Potts discusses are intent
on framing, and thus delimiting, the experience of their viewers (even if those “viewers”
are “participants”). Merely because a work
or event produces an effect of de-authored
meaning does not imply that the artist has
turned over the determination of meaning to
the audience.
In an art-historical landscape increasingly exposed to and tolerant of various
aspects of “new” materialisms—thing
theory, object-oriented ontology, speculative
realism, affect theory, and neuroaesthetics,
to name the most prominent—Potts’s book
is a reminder of the contribution art history
can make to contemporary debates about
meaning and agency in other fields. Although
he does not address directly the aforementioned lines of inquiry, his arguments for
the artwork’s meaning over its mere particularity have wide impact. Positions that
overemphasize materiality, for instance, tend
to redescribe the work of art as identical
to its physical features, so much so that all

of the material features of the object—as
well as all the configurations into which it
contingently falls—are seen to contribute
to its meaning. If that is so, it would seem
that all of the physical characteristics of the
environment or situation within which the
object commands our attention must also
matter, including all of the characteristics
we might identify with the position (actual
or metaphorical) of a viewer. One might
legitimately wonder how interpretation—
which targets what the work of art means, in
contradistinction to what we experience it
as—factors into a situation where descriptions of the object’s effects trump arguments
about the artist’s intent, and where questions
about understanding are replaced by questions about what the reader or viewer feels
or experiences.
Although the phenomenon is not without its theoretical problems, contingency
is at the heart of Potts’s contention that
experimental realism offers a more compelling artistic engagement with the conditions
of the world than does high-modernist art.
Key to the disruption of what it takes to
be the fiction of abstraction’s autonomy,
realism sets up a “contingent interplay”
between the material fabric of the artwork
and the culturally determined references
it makes (41). This interplay is dialectical. The material configuration, according
to Potts, has a “generalised evocativeness”
that explains why viewers are compelled
to attend to the work (or event) in the first
place. But unless its evocations are directed
to an identifiable reality, the work or event,
and our responses to it, will remain “insubstantial and subjective” (42). At the same
time, the presence of clear referents “never
abolishes the contingent and unstable nature
of what is being conjured up” by the artist (42). So, Potts argues, Happenings may
attract us by virtue either of their banality
or their “melodramatic excess” (344), but
the event is destined to remain meaningless
unless the nonart materials it intentionally
incorporates into its staging connect to the
wider world to “embody significant aspects
of modern life [and] . . . certain underlying realities of human existence” (342).
Kaprow’s Happenings may have appeared
utterly contingent, but they were based on
scores that were “carefully crafted creations
with a clear artistic and conceptual rationale”
(339) intended to make events that were
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“expressive and symbolically loaded” (344).
Similarly, viewers of Fahlström’s paintingassemblages are asked to be active participants in the ensemble, but their actions are
subject to certain constraints or rules, which
ensured that their participation would not
produce just “arbitrary and inconsequential
rearrangements” (303).5
Admittedly, many of the artists Potts
discusses make work that, in its structural
organization or performative display, seems
to invite viewers to entertain the fiction that
they create their own meaning from the
proliferating associations occasioned by their
encounters. But the overall thrust of Potts’s
argument demands that we recognize the
difference between association and interpretation. The artist may indeed make work that
“baffles” and “frustrates” coherence (177),
but the viewer’s various “constellations of
meaning” (35) will remain arbitrary unless
they are advanced as claims and supported by
arguments about what specific constellations
the artist intended us to entertain, however
much he or she tries strategically to create
the effect that the work is not a “deliberate
contrivance” (236).
Still, Potts’s investment in the contingency of meaning runs the risk of sounding
like an endorsement of anti-intentionalism.
Realism “open[s] itself up to contingencies of meaning and reference inherent in
the materials . . . and that get into the work
regardless of and sometimes despite the perspective that the artist brings to bear” (318).
But if meaning is inherent in materials, it is
hard to anticipate where that would leave the
practice of interpretation as it is traditionally
understood. For instance, in a discussion of
the various wartime associations a viewer
might project onto Richter’s photographically based painting Christa und Wolfi (1964)
—which features a large Alsatian dog like
those used by the Nazi police—Potts suggests
that the expressive overtones such imagery
solicits were “not simply put there by the
artist but to a degree inhere in the image given
by the photograph” (246, emphasis added).
And discussing Joseph Beuys’s action I Like
America and America Likes Me (1974), Potts concludes, “The work comes to mean something
because in the viewer’s mind the references
to some larger reality are suggestively but
also somewhat bafflingly embedded in the
immediate sensory substance of the work”
(401, emphasis added). Glossing a quote by
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Rauschenberg, Potts notes that since politics
was a pervasive dimension of the environment in which the artist worked, his materials were “saturated with political meaning, not
because he put such meaning there” (315,
emphasis added). If meaning is inherent in
materials, though, then it must be divorced
from what the artist might have wanted to
express or convey. Consequently, we need
feel no compulsion to advance claims or
make arguments about what we think she
meant.
In the end, what makes the effect of
contingency in experimental realist art politically significant is the dialectical opposition
it offers to the repressive situation from
which it springs. Potts explains this relation
in The Sculptural Imagination:
The instability of a viewer’s encounter
[with the work of art is] integral to any
affective and conceptual power it might
have, as well as to any resistance it might
offer to being consumed as a mere commodity. Yet such instability . . . [paradoxically] conforms to the disintegrating
drive of an increasingly pervasive and
unrestricted process of commodification,
consumption and capital accumulation.6
The objects and practices Potts investigates
in his study simultaneously reflect and resist
the processes of capitalism. Ian Hamilton’s
paintings, which present their viewers with
highly incongruous arrays of nearly illegible
but still recognizable imagery, strongly evoke
but ultimately stand “at odds with the seamless assemblages of the advertising world”
(179). Heterogeneity, juxtaposition, collision, disruption, incongruity: these aspects
of experimental realist art—as object, or
action, or some hybrid of the two—confront
the “constant proliferation, replication and
reconstitution of imagery in modern media
culture” (232). Potts expresses the dire situation in these terms (again, in The Sculptural
Imagination):
In the circumstances of contemporary
capitalism’s unrelenting dissolution and
remaking of those cultural norms that
momentarily mediate between the individual’s self-awareness and a sense of
the larger social and economic realities
within which this self-awareness is constituted, the compelling art work will no
longer be one that purports to embody
some stable essence of individual subjec-

tivity. If a work gives rise to a vivid subjective awareness, this awareness cannot
seem to be encapsulated in some potentially inert and fixed objective thing.7
The modern condition of which Potts so
ardently writes seems for experimental
realists ever more present, intruding ever
more deeply into every aspect of social and
psychological life. The complexities of that
incursion are made manifest in a diversity
of artworks and practices that the author—
through his unflinching commitment to the
idea that art challenges the deleterious effects
of those incursions, as much as through his
irrepressible optimism that in doing so art
draws us closer to our historical reality—
brings to life for his readers.
1. For instance, although in a discussion of French
New Realism Potts mentions the prewar debates
between Communist realists and abstract artists
of various political persuasions (48), he misses
an opportunity to bear down on the historical
specificity of that moment and doesn’t investigate
how that contest and its postwar legacy—and
the fluctuating political, economic, and ideological
conditions underpinning each moment—constituted a key background for some of the artists he
gathers under the experimental realist umbrella.
In France, for example, the debates held in 1936
at the Maison de le Culture, a cultural center run
by the French Communist Party, and published
as La Querelle du Réalisme, explored exactly this
terrain. For an analysis, see Toby Norris, Modern
Artists and the State between the Two World Wars
(PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2005), esp.
192–96. The same questions regarding realism,
abstraction, and politics were raised again after
the Second World War, although in a more polarized climate shaped by the influence of the French
Communist party, which had thrown its weight
behind an orthodox realism of explicitly political intent. See Natalie Adamson, Painting, Politics
and the Struggle for the École de Paris, 1944–1964
(Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2009).
2. The phrase is from Ad Reinhardt, who wrote,
“A painting of quality is a challenge to disorder
and insensitivity everywhere.” Reinhardt, “How
to Look at Space,” PM, April 28, 1946. For a
discussion of modernist art’s capacity to critique repressive ideology and conservatism, see
Charles Harrison, “Disorder and Insensitivity: The
Concept of Experience in Abstract Expressionist
Painting,” in American Abstract Expressionism, ed.
D. Thistlewood (Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 1993), 111–28.
3. It is a tactic of some historians of 1960s art first
to conflate and then attack the positions of the
critics who best articulated high-modernist criticism—Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried—
for what they take to be their narrow essentialism
(although Potts, to his credit, does not). That
reductive tendency is often accompanied by an
almost willful avoidance of what those critics
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in fact say. Admittedly, a strand of Greenberg’s
thought tended increasingly to emphasize the
discovery of an irreducible essence of pictorial art. But for the critic’s view on the historical
relation of autonomy to convention, see the
triumvirate of important essays from 1947 to 1948,
“The Present Prospects of American Painting and
Sculpture,” Horizon, October 1947; “The Situation
at the Moment,” Partisan Review, January 1948;
and “The Crisis of the Easel Picture,” Partisan
Review, April 1948. All three essays are reprinted
in volume 2 of Clement Greenberg: The Collected
Essays and Criticism, ed. John O’Brian, 4 vols.
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1986–1993). For Fried’s account of his
attempt to historicize the concept of essence
as found in some of Greenberg’s writings, see
“An Introduction to My Art Criticism,” in Art
and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1–76,
esp. 36ff.
4. For an analysis of this distinction, see Walter
Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967
to the End of History (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2004), esp. 1–18.
5. From one perspective, it is possible to see the
dialectical interplay of materiality and cultural
reference that Potts theorizes as an attempt
to address a dualism, stemming from romantic
aesthetics, that remained latent in high-modernist
criticism. If the romantic tendency is to establish
a dualism between art (broadly associated with
beauty, disinterest, and the intuition of aesthetic
unity) and science (as the domain of the practical,
utilitarian, and empirical), Potts finds the most
convincing artists to be those who are open to
everyday praxis—and is compelled by art that
can express the fundamentally temporal and
historical involvement of agents in the world. That
emphasis lends to his account of experimental
art a certain existential cast (as do his occasional
references to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger). For a
useful discussion of the dualism as it appears in
the writings of some existential phenomenologists, see Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1980), esp. 81–90.
6. Alex Potts, The Sculptural Imagination: Figurative,
Modernist, Minimalist (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 2000), 23.
7. Ibid., 18.
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